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Abstract
Finitely many agents have single-peaked preferences on a finite set of alternatives
structured as a tree. Under a richness condition on the domain we characterize all
unanimous and strategy-proof random social choice functions. These functions are
uniquely determined by the values they assign to preference profiles where all peaks
are on leafs of the tree.
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1 Introduction
Finitely many agents have preferences over a finite set of alternatives. The alternatives
are the vertices in a tree, and preferences are linear orderings which are single-peaked:
there is a single peak (top alternative) and preference decreases along paths away from this
peak. Moreover, it is assumed that the domain of admissible single-peaked preferences is
sufficiently rich; this includes the condition of top-connectedness, meaning that for every
pair of alternatives a and b between which there is an edge, there is a preference with a at
top and b second.
We consider random social choice functions: these assign a probability distribution over
the alternatives to every profile of preferences. The conditions we impose are unanimity
and strategy-proofness. Unanimity means that if the agents share a common peak then
that alternative gets probability one. Strategy-proofness means that no agent, by misrepre-
senting its true preference, can increase the probability on any upper contour set, i.e., any
set of alternatives (weakly) preferred to some given alternative. Put differently, the proba-
bility distribution attained by reporting truthfully stochastically dominates any probability
distribution achievable by misreporting.
∗The authors would like to thank Huaxia Zeng and Arunava Sen for their helpful suggestions.
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Our main result is that a random social choice function satisfies these two conditions if
and only if it is tree-monotonic. In a nutshell, this means that such a random social choice
function is uniquely determined by the probability distributions it assigns to preference
profiles with all peaks at the leafs (terminal nodes) of the tree. We show that such a
collection of probability distributions has the following properties: (i) a leaf gets probability
one if all peaks are at this leaf (ii) if an agent changes its peak from one leaf to another, then
(a) probability increases along the path from the former to the latter and (b) probability
does not change off this path. Conversely, every such collection determines a random social
choice function that is unanimous and strategy-proof.
The paper thus generalizes the case where the alternatives are ordered on a straight line
and agents have single-peaked preferences: see below for a short discussion of this literature.
As an application, consider a road or railroad network in the form of a tree (especially in the
railroad case this is not a far-fetched assumption), where the vertices (junctions) are also
the locations of villages or cities. The objective is to locate a public good (shopping mall,
museum, etc.) based on the preferences of the agents over these junctions – single-peakedness
is then a plausible assumption.
The literature on random social choice functions started with the paper of Gibbard (1977).
Without restrictions on preferences, the conditions of unanimity and strategy-proofness re-
sult in random dictatorships – that is, fixed probability distributions over the top alternatives
of the agents. The single-peaked domain restriction allows for other functions, which can be
seen as probabilistic extensions of the generalized median functions (Moulin, 1980; Barbera`
et al., 1993; and others): see Ehlers et al. (2002) for the case with finitely many agents who
have single-peaked preferences over the real line. In Peters et al. (2014) it is shown for a
discrete version of this model (finitely many alternatives on the real line) that all random
social choice functions are convex combinations of deterministic functions. In the concluding
Section 5 we show that in the current setting this is no longer the case, by providing an ex-
ample of a random tree-monotonic social choice function which is not a convex combination
of deterministic tree-monotonic social choice functions. The current paper can be seen as
generalizing, albeit for a finite set of alternatives, the results in Ehlers et al. (2002) to the sit-
uation where the alternatives are structured on a tree. Chatterji et al. (2016) show a kind of
converse: a domain has to be single-peaked in order to allow for the existence of unanimous
and strategy-proof random social choice functions satisfying two additional conditions.1 See
also Chatterji and Masso´ (2015) for a similar result in the deterministic case.
After preliminaries in Section 2, we show in Section 3 that on a rich single-peaked domain
any unanimous and strategy-proof random social choice function is uncompromising (cf.
Border and Jordan, 1983): changing one’s peak can only change the probabilities on the
path from the old towards the new peak, but not those off this path. While this is a
relatively easy result in the real-line case, its proof is rather cumbersome in the tree-case.
Using this result (Theorem 3.1) we show in Section 4 that the unanimous and strategy-proof
random social choice functions are exactly the tree-monotonic social choice functions briefly
described above (Theorem 4.1). Section 5 concludes.
1Namely, tops-onliness and a ‘compromise’ property. Under the assumptions in our paper tops-onliness
follows from the other conditions. The ‘compromise’ property is not necessarily satisfied by a tree-monotonic
random social choice function.
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2 Preliminaries
Let A be a finite set of alternatives and let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of agents. A
complete, asymmetric, and transitive binary relation over A (also called a linear order) is
called a preference. A collection of preferences PN = (P1, . . . , Pn) is called a preference
profile. We denote by L(A) the set of all preferences over A. A domain (of admissible
preferences) is a subset of L(A).
For a preference P ∈ L(A) we denote the top alternative by t(P ), i.e., t(P ) = a if and
only if aPx for all x ∈ A \ {a}. The upper contour set of an alternative a at preference P is
the set U(a, P ) = {x ∈ A | xPa or x = a}.
2.1 Domains and their properties
A domain of central importance in social choice theory is the single-peaked domain. It was
originally introduced in Black (1948) and Inada (1964). Here, we consider a generalization.
First, we introduce a graph structure on the set of alternatives. A collection E ⊆ {{a, b} |
a, b ∈ A, a 6= b} is an undirected graph. The elements of E are called edges. The degree of
a ∈ A is the number of edges to which it belongs, i.e., the number |{{x, y} ∈ E | a ∈ {x, y}}|.
For a, b ∈ A a path [a, b] is a sequence of nodes (a1, . . . , ak) such that a1 = a, ak = b, and
(ai, ai+1) ∈ E for all i = 1, . . . , k−1. In this case, by (a, b] we denote the sequence (a2, . . . , ak),
and by (a, b) the sequence (a2, . . . , ak−1). Whenever it is clear from the context, the notations
[a, b], (a, b], and (a, b) will also be used to denote the sets of nodes (instead of the sequences)
that appear in the path.
A graph E is a tree if for all a, b ∈ A there is a unique path [a, b]. Throughout this paper,
we assume that E is an arbitrary but fixed tree. By AL ⊆ A, we denote the set of alternatives
with degree 1 (also called leafs), and by AJ ⊆ A, we denote the set of alternatives with degree
more than two (also called junction nodes). Thus, the alternatives in A are partitioned into
three sets: the leafs, the junction nodes, and the nodes with degree exactly two.
Definition 2.1. A preference P is single-peaked if for all distinct x, y ∈ A with y 6= t(P ),
x ∈ [t(P ), y] =⇒ xPy.
A domain is single-peaked if each preference in it is single-peaked.2
To facilitate our next definitions, we introduce a few pieces of notation. For a path
[x1, xℓ] = (x1, . . . , xℓ), we write P = [x1, xl] · · · to denote a preference P with x1Px2P · · ·Pxℓ
Px for all x ∈ A \ [x1, xℓ]. Notations like P = · · · [x1, xℓ] · · · and combinations of these have
similar meanings. also, brackets are sometimes left out if confusion is unlikely.
Our next definition introduces a well-known property of a domain.
Definition 2.2. A single-peaked domain S is top-connected if for every {a, b} ∈ E there
exists a preference P ∈ S with P = ab · · · .
Peters et al. (2104) introduce a minimal richness condition for a single-peaked domain
on a line. Our next definition is a modification of this condition for a single-peaked domain
on a tree.
2For a single-peaked preference, the top alternative is also called the peak.
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Figure 1: The tree in Example 2.1
Definition 2.3. A single-peaked domain S is rich if (i) it is top-connected and (ii) for all
junction nodes a ∈ AJ and all leafs b, b
′ ∈ AL such that a ∈ [b, b
′], there exists a preference
P ∈ S of the form P = [a, b] · · · (a, b′] · · · such that for all c ∈ A for which a ∈ [c, b] ∩ [c, b′],
we have b′Pc.
Note that this richness property does not require anything for preferences having a non-
junction node as the top alternative. Thus, a top-connected single-peaked domain on a line is
rich. This shows that our richness condition is weaker than the ‘minimal richness’ condition
in Peters et al. (2014).3
We illustrate the notion of richness by means of the following example.
Example 2.1. Consider the tree in Figure 1. Consider the non-junction-node a4. Then,
the richness property requires that there must two preferences a4a5 · · · and a4a2 · · · in the
domain with a4 at the top. Now, consider the junction-node a5. In what follows, we present
all the preferences with a5 at the top that are required by the richness property. It is easy to
see that there are sixteen choices of b and b′ such that a5 ∈ [b, b
′]. Therefore, by the richness
property, there must be a preference satisfying (ii) in Definition 2.3 for each such choice of b
and b′. In Table 1, we present all these sixteen preference types. The second and the third
row in the table provide the choices of b and b′, respectively. The preferences are presented
as columns. For ease of presentation, alternatives outside the paths [a5, b] and [a5, b
′] are
not mentioned in the preferences. They are assumed to follow (ii) in Definition 2.3. For
instance, in P1, P2, and P3, the position of a3 is unrestricted within the dotted space, and
all other alternatives must be below b′ for those preferences.
2.2 Social choice functions and their properties
By △A, we denote the set of all probability distributions on A. We fix a single-peaked
domain S, and denote by SN the set of all profiles with preferences in S. For a ∈ A, Sa is
the subset of S of preferences with a at top, i.e., Sa = {P ∈ S | t(P ) = a}.
A random social choice function (RSCF) is a function ϕ : SN → △A. For B ⊆ A and
PN ∈ S
N , we write ϕB(PN) =
∑
a∈B ϕa(PN), where ϕa(PN) is the probability of a at ϕ(PN).
3This condition is as follows. A single-peaked preference (on a line) is called left (right) single-peaked if
all the alternatives that are on the left (right) of the peak are preferred to all those that are on the right
(left) of the peak. A single-peaked domain is said to be ‘minimally rich’ if it contains all left single-peaked
and all right single-peaked preferences. Clearly, the richness condition in Definition 2.3 does not imply this.
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P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16
b a1 a1 a1 a3 a3 a3 a8 a8 a8 a9 a9 a9 a6 a6 a6 a6
b′ a6 a8 a9 a6 a8 a9 a1 a3 a6 a1 a3 a6 a1 a3 a8 a9
a5 a5 a5 a5 a5 a5 a5 a5 a5 a5 a5 a5 a5 a5 a5 a5
a4 a4 a4 a4 a4 a4 a7 a7 a7 a7 a7 a7 a6 a6 a6 a6
a2 a2 a2 a2 a2 a2 a8 a8 a8 a9 a9 a9 a4 a4 a7 a7
a1 a1 a1 a3 a3 a3
...
...
...
...
...
... a2 a2 a8 a9
...
...
...
...
...
... a4 a4 a6 a4 a4 a6 a1 a3
...
...
a6 a7 a7 a6 a7 a7 a2 a2
... a2 a2
...
...
...
...
...
... a8 a9
... a8 a9 a1 a3
... a1 a3
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
Table 1: Set of preferences with a5 at the top satisfying the richness property
Definition 2.4. An RSCF ϕ is unanimous if ϕa(PN) = 1 for all a ∈ A and all PN ∈ (S
a)N .
Definition 2.5. An RSCF ϕ is strategy-proof if for all i ∈ N , all PN ∈ S
N , all P ′i ∈ S, and
all x ∈ A,
ϕU(x,Pi)(Pi, P−i) ≥ ϕU(x,Pi)(P
′
i , P−i).
For later reference we include the following observation.
Remark 2.1. Let L,L′ ∈ △A and let P ∈ L(A). Suppose LU(x,P ) = L
′
U(x,P ) for all x ∈ A.
Then L = L′.
Two profiles PN , P
′
N ∈ S
N are tops-equivalent if t(Pi) = t(P
′
i ) for all i ∈ N .
Definition 2.6. An RSCF ϕ is tops-only if ϕ(PN) = ϕ(P
′
N) for all tops-equivalent PN , P
′
N ∈
SN .
Definition 2.7. An RSCF ϕ is uncompromising if ϕd(PN) = ϕd(P
′
i , P−i) for all i ∈ N , all
PN ∈ S
N , all P ′i ∈ S and all d ∈ A such that d /∈ [t(Pi), t(P
′
i )].
Note that an uncompromising RSCF is tops-only.
3 Unanimity, strategy-proofness, and uncompromising-
ness
The aim of this section is to prove that on a rich single-peaked domain, unanimity and
strategy-proofness of an RSCF imply uncompromisingness.
We introduce the following pieces of notation. For P ∈ L(A) and B ⊆ A, P |B ∈ L(B) is
the restriction of P to B, that is: for all a, b ∈ B, aP |Bb if and only if aPb. For X,Y ⊆ A and
P ∈ L(A), we write XPY to mean xPy for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . For PN ∈ L(A)
N , S ⊆ N
and i ∈ N , P−S and P−i denote the restrictions of PN to N \ S and N \ {i}, respectively.
The announced result is the following.
Theorem 3.1. Let S be a rich single-peaked domain, and let ϕ : SN →△A be a unanimous
and strategy-proof RSCF. Then ϕ is uncompromising.
The proof of this theorem is rather lengthy and involves a number of lemmas.
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3.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
We first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Let ϕ : SN → △A be a strategy-proof RSCF. Let PN ∈ S
N , P ′i ∈ S, and
B,C ⊆ A be such that BPiC, BP
′
iC, and Pi|C = P
′
i |C. Suppose ϕC(PN) = ϕC(P
′
i , P−i) and
ϕa(PN) = ϕa(P
′
i , P−i) for all a /∈ B ∪ C. Then ϕa(PN) = ϕa(P
′
i , P−i) for all a ∈ C.
Proof. First note that since ϕC(PN) = ϕC(P
′
i , P−i) and ϕa(PN) = ϕa(P
′
i , P−i) for all a /∈
B ∪ C, ϕB(PN) = ϕB(P
′
i , P−i). Suppose b ∈ C is such that ϕb(PN) 6= ϕb(P
′
i , P−i) and
ϕa(PN) = ϕa(P
′
i , P−i) for all a ∈ C with aPib. In other words, b is the maximal element of C
according to Pi that violates the assertion of the lemma. Without loss of generality, assume
that ϕb(PN) < ϕb(P
′
i , P−i). This, together with the facts that BPiC, ϕB(PN) = ϕB(P
′
i , P−i),
and ϕa(PN) = ϕa(P
′
i , P−i) for all a /∈ B with aPib, implies ϕU(b,Pi)(PN) < ϕU(b,Pi)(P
′
i , P−i).
This means that agent i manipulates at PN via P
′
i , which is a contradiction.
We prove the theorem by induction on the number of agents. If |N | = 1, then uncompro-
misingness is implied by unanimity. Assume that the theorem holds for all sets with k < n
agents. We now prove it for n agents. Let N∗ = N \ {1}. Define the RSCF g : SN
∗
→ △A
for N∗ as follows: for all PN∗ = (P2, P3, . . . , Pn) ∈ S
N∗ ,
g(P2, P3, . . . , Pn) = ϕ(P2, P2, P3, P4, . . . , Pn).
Evidently, g is a well-defined RSCF satisfying unanimity and strategy-proofness (see
Lemma 3 in Sen (2011) for a detailed argument). Hence, by the induction hypothesis, g
satisfies uncompromisingness.
Lemma 3.2. Let PN , P
′
N ∈ S
N be two tops-equivalent profiles such that t(P1) = t(P2). Then
ϕ(PN) = ϕ(P
′
N).
Proof. Note that since g is uncompromising, g satisfies tops-onlyness, hence g(P1, P−{1,2}) =
g(P2, P−{1,2}), and therefore ϕ(P1, P1, P−{1,2}) = ϕ(P2, P2, P−{1,2}). We show that ϕ(P1, P2,
P−{1,2}) = ϕ(P1, P1, P−{1,2}). Using strategy-proofness of ϕ for agent 2, we have ϕU(x,P1)(P1, P1,
P−{1,2}) ≥ ϕU(x,P1)(P1, P2, P−{1,2}) for all x ∈ A, and using strategy-proofness of ϕ for
agent 1, we have ϕU(x,P1)(P1, P2, P−{1,2}) ≥ ϕU(x,P1)(P2, P2, P−{1,2}) for all x ∈ A. Since
ϕ(P1, P1, P−{1,2}) = ϕ(P2, P2, P−{1,2}), it follows from Remark 2.1 that ϕ(P1, P1, P−{1,2}) =
ϕ(P1, P2, P−{1,2}). Using a similar argument, we have ϕ(P
′
1, P
′
1, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕ(P
′
1, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2}).
Because g is tops-only and PN , P
′
N are tops-equivalent, we have g(P1, P−{1,2}) = g(P
′
1, P
′
−{1,2}).
This means ϕ(P1, P1, P−{1,2}) = ϕ(P
′
1, P
′
1, P
′
−{1,2}), and hence ϕ(P1, P2, P−{1,2}) = ϕ(P
′
1, P
′
2,
P ′−{1,2}).
Lemma 3.3. Let PN , P
′
N ∈ S
N be such that t(P1) = t(P2), t(P
′
1) = t(P
′
2), and t(Pi) = t(P
′
i )
for all i 6= 1, 2. Then ϕc(PN) = ϕc(P
′
N) for all c /∈ [t(P1), t(P2)].
Proof. Let c /∈ [t(P1), t(P2)]. Then
ϕc(P1, P2, P−{1,2]}) = ϕc(P1, P1, P−{1,2]})
= gc(P1, P−{1,2]})
= gc(P
′
1, P−{1,2]})
= ϕc(P
′
1, P
′
1, P−{1,2]})
= ϕc(P
′
1, P
′
2, P−{1,2]})
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where the first and last equalities follow from Lemma 3.2, and the third follows since g is
uncompromising.
Lemma 3.4. Let PN , P
′
N ∈ S
N and a, b ∈ A such that P1, P2, P
′
1 ∈ S
a, P ′2 ∈ S
b, and
t(Pi) = t(P
′
i ) for all i 6= 1, 2. Then ϕc(PN) = ϕc(P
′
N) for all c /∈ U(b, P
′
1) ∩ U(a, P
′
2).
Proof. By Lemma 3.2, ϕ(P1, P2, P−{1,2}) = ϕ(P
′
1, P
′
1, P
′
−{1,2}). Hence, it suffices to show
that ϕc(P
′
1, P
′
1, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕc(P
′
1, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2}) for c /∈ U(b, P
′
1) ∩ U(a, P
′
2). We prove this for
c /∈ U(b, P ′1), the proof for c /∈ U(a, P
′
2) is analogous.
Take c /∈ U(b, P ′1). By strategy-proofness of ϕ,
ϕU(c,P ′
1
)(P
′
1, P
′
1, P
′
−{1,2}) ≥ ϕU(c,P ′1)(P
′
1, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2}) ≥ ϕU(c,P ′1)(P
′
2, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2}).
Moreover, by Lemma 3.3, ϕx(P
′
1, P
′
1, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕx(P
′
2, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2}) for all x /∈ [a, b], and
hence ϕB(P
′
1, P
′
1, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕB(P
′
2, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2}) for all B ⊆ A such that [a, b] ⊆ B. Since
c /∈ U(b, P ′1) and t(P
′
1) = a, by definition of a single-peaked domain, we have [a, b] ⊆ U(c, P
′
1),
and hence
ϕU(c,P ′
1
)(P
′
1, P
′
1, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕU(c,P ′1)(P
′
1, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2}). (1)
Let d be the alternative that ranks just above c in P ′1, i.e., P
′
1 = · · · dc · · · . Then, [a, b] ⊆
U(d, P ′1), and hence
ϕU(d,P ′
1
)(P
′
1, P
′
1, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕU(d,P ′1)(P
′
1, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2}). (2)
Subtracting (2) from (1), we have ϕc(P
′
1, P
′
1, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕc(P
′
1, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2}), which completes
the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 3.5. The RSCF ϕ satisfies the following properties:
(i) ϕd(PN) = ϕd(P
′
2, P−2) for all d /∈ [t(P1), t(P
′
2)], all PN ∈ S
n with P1 = P2, and all
P ′2 ∈ S, and
(ii) ϕ is tops-only.4
Proof. For k ≥ 0, let
Pk = {PN ∈ S
N | |(t(P1), t(P2)) ∩ AJ | ≤ k}.
Note that Pk = S
n when k is equal to the length of the maximal path in the tree minus two.
We prove this lemma by induction on k.
Base case. Take PN , (P
′
2, P−2) ∈ P0. Since |(t(P1), t(P
′
2)) ∩ AJ | = 0, by the definition of
single-peakedness, U(t(P ′2), P1) ∩ U(t(P1), P
′
2) = [t(P1), t(P
′
2)]. Hence, by Lemma 3.4,
ϕd(PN) = ϕd(P
′
2, P−2) ∀d /∈ [t(P1), t(P
′
2)]. (3)
This proves condition (i) for the base case.
Next, we show condition (ii) for the base case, that is, ϕ(PN) = ϕ(P
′
N) for tops-equivalent
profiles PN , P
′
N ∈ P0. It is enough to show that ϕ(PN) = ϕ(P
′
1, P2, P
′
−{1,2}), since then, by a
4Chatterji and Zeng (2015) provide a sufficient condition for a domain to be tops-only for RSCFs. How-
ever, our domain does not satisfy that condition.
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symmetric argument, we can derive ϕ(P ′1, P2, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕ(P
′
N), and combining the two we
can conclude ϕ(PN) = ϕ(P
′
N).
By Lemma 3.2,
ϕ(P1, P1, P−{1,2}) = ϕ(P
′
1, P
′
1, P
′
−{1,2}). (4)
Using a similar argument as for the derivation of (3), we have
ϕd(P1, P1, P−{1,2}) = ϕd(PN) for all d /∈ [t(P1), t(P2)], and (5)
ϕd(P
′
1, P
′
1, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕd(P
′
1, P2, P
′
−2) for all d /∈ [t(P
′
1), t(P2)]. (6)
As t(P1) = t(P
′
1), combining (4), (5), and (6), we have ϕd(PN) = ϕd(P
′
1, P2, P
′
−2) for
all d /∈ [t(P1), t(P2)]. Moreover, as t(P1) = t(P
′
1), by single-peakedness, P1|[t(P1),t(P2)] =
P ′1|[t(P1),t(P2)]. Now, applying Lemma 3.1 with B = ∅ and C = [t(P1), t(P2)], we have
ϕ(PN) = ϕ(P
′
1, P2, P
′
−2). This proves condition (ii) for the base case.
Induction step. Take k > 0. Suppose that ϕ satisfies property (i) in the lemma when
PN , (P
′
2, P−2) ∈ Pk−1, and property (ii) when ϕ is restricted to Pk−1, that is, ϕ(PN) = ϕ(P
′
N)
for all tops-equivalent PN , P
′
N ∈ Pk−1.
Take PN , (P
′
2, P−2) ∈ Pk \ Pk−1 with P1 = P2. Let c ∈ (t(P1), t(P
′
2)) be the junction
node such that there is no junction node in (t(P ′2), c). Since |(c, t(P1))∩AJ | = k− 1, by the
induction hypothesis, we have for all d /∈ [t(P1), c] and all P¯ ∈ S
c,
ϕd(PN) = ϕd(P¯ , P−2). (7)
Let X,Y ⊆ A be such that X = {x | t(P1) ∈ (x, t(P
′
2)]} and Y = {y | t(P
′
2) ∈ (y, t(P1)]}.
We prove the following claims.
Claim 1. Let P¯ ∈ Sc and d ∈ X ∪ Y . Then ϕd(P¯ , P−2) = ϕd(P
′
2, P−2).
Proof. Note that x /∈ U(t(P1), P
′
2) for all x ∈ X and y /∈ U(t(P
′
2), P1) for all y ∈ Y . Thus, by
Lemma 3.4, ϕd(PN) = ϕd(P
′
2, P−2). Since d /∈ [t(P1), c], by (7), ϕd(PN) = ϕd(P¯ , P−2). Hence
Claim 1 follows.
Claim 2. Let Pˆ ∈ Sc. Then ϕ[t(P ′
2
),c](P
′
2, P−2) = ϕ[t(P ′2),c](Pˆ , P−2).
Proof. Let b ∈ AL be such that t(P
′
2) ∈ [c, b]. By the richness property, there exists P¯ ∈ S
c
such that P¯ = [c, b] · · · . By strategy-proofness,
ϕ[c,b](P¯ , P−2) ≥ ϕ[c,b](P
′
2, P−2). (8)
Take d ∈ (t(P ′2), b]. Because [t(P1), t(P
′
2)]∩ (t(P
′
2), b] = ∅, we have t(P
′
2) ∈ (d, t(P1)] which in
turn implies d ∈ Y . Therefore, by Claim 1, ϕd(P¯ , P−2) = ϕd(P
′
2, P−2), and hence
ϕ(t(P ′
2
),b](P¯ , P−2) = ϕ(t(P ′
2
),b](P
′
2, P−2). (9)
By subtracting (9) from (8), we have
ϕ[c,t(P ′
2
)](P¯ , P−2) ≥ ϕ[c,t(P ′
2
)](P
′
2, P−2). (10)
We next show that ϕ[c,t(P ′
2
)](P
′
2, P−2) ≥ ϕ[c,t(P ′2)](P¯ , P−2). By strategy-proofness,
ϕU(c,P ′
2
)(P
′
2, P−2) ≥ ϕU(c,P ′2)(P¯ , P−2). (11)
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Take d ∈ U(c, P ′2) \ [c, t(P
′
2)]. Using similar arguments as for the derivation of (9), we have
ϕU(c,P ′
2
)\[c,t(P ′
2
)](P
′
2, P−2) = ϕU(c,P ′2)\[c,t(P ′2)](P¯ , P−2). (12)
By subtracting (12) from (11),
ϕ[c,t(P ′
2
)](P
′
2, P−2) ≥ ϕ[c,t(P ′2)](P¯ , P−2). (13)
Combining (10) and (13), we have ϕ[c,t(P ′
2
)](P
′
2, P−2) = ϕ[c,t(P ′2)](P¯
c, P−2). Now Claim 2 follows
since ϕ[t(P ′
2
),c](Pˆ , P−2) = ϕ[t(P ′
2
),c](P¯ , P−2) by (7).
Claim 3. Let b ∈ AL such that t(P
′
2) /∈ [c, b]. Let z ∈ (c, b] and Pˆ ∈ S
c. Then
ϕ(c,z](Pˆ , P−2) ≥ ϕ(c,z](P
′
2, P−2).
Proof. Take b¯ ∈ AL such that t(P
′
2) ∈ [c, b¯] and take P¯ = [c, b¯] · · · (c, b] · · · such that for all
a ∈ A with c ∈ [a, b¯] ∩ [a, b], we have bP¯ a. Since c ∈ AJ and b¯, b ∈ AL, such a preference
exists by richness of S. By strategy-proofness, we have for all z ∈ (c, b],
ϕU(z,P¯ )(P¯ , P−2) ≥ ϕU(z,P¯ )(P
′
2, P−2). (14)
By the definition of P¯ , d ∈ Y for all d ∈ U(z, P¯ ) \ [t(P ′2), z]. Therefore, by Claim 1,
ϕU(z,P¯ )\[t(P ′
2
),z](P¯ , P−2) = ϕU(z,P¯ )\[t(P ′
2
),z](P
′
2, P−2). (15)
Subtracting (15) from (14), we obtain ϕ[t(P ′
2
),z](P¯ , P−2) ≥ ϕ[t(P ′
2
),z](P
′
2, P−2). Since [t(P
′
2), z] =
[t(P ′2), c] ∪ (c, z], by Claim 2 we have
ϕ(c,z](P¯ , P−2) ≥ ϕ(c,z](P
′
2, P−2). (16)
Now Claim 3 follows since ϕ(c,z](P¯ , P−2) = ϕ(c,z](Pˆ , P−2) by (7).
Claim 4. ϕd(P¯ , P−2) = ϕd(P
′
2, P−2) for all d /∈ [c, r1(P
′
2)] and all P¯ ∈ S
c.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that there exists d /∈ [c, r1(P
′
2)] and P¯ ∈ S
c such that
ϕd(P¯ , P−2) 6= ϕd(P
′
2, P−2). Without loss of generality, assume that d is the maximal alterna-
tive according to P ′2 with this property, i.e., ϕx(P¯ , P−2) = ϕx(P
′
2, P−2) for all x /∈ [c, r1(P
′
2)]
with xP ′2d.
First, we show cP ′2d. Suppose not. As d /∈ [c, r1(P
′
2)] and c ∈ [r1(P1), r1(P
′
2)], dP
′
2c implies
d ∈ Y . However, by Claim 1, this means ϕd(P¯ , P−2) = ϕd(P
′
2, P−2), a contradiction. This
proves cP ′2d.
Now we complete the proof of the claim. By single-peakedness, [c, r1(P
′
2)] ⊆ U(d, P
′
2).
Therefore, by Claim 2 and our assumption on d, ϕU(d,P ′
2
)\{d}(P¯ , P−2) = ϕU(d,P ′
2
)\{d}(P
′
2, P−2).
If ϕd(P¯ , P−2) > ϕd(P
′
2, P−2), then agent 2 manipulates at (P
′
2, P−2) via P¯ , a contradiction.
So, assume ϕd(P
′
2, P−2) > ϕd(P¯ , P−2). Let b¯, b
′ ∈ AL with b¯ 6= b
′ be such that t(P ′2) ∈ [c, b¯]
and d ∈ [c, b′]. Such distinct b¯ and b′ must exist as d /∈ Y by Claim 1, hence d /∈ Y ∪ [t(P ′2), c].
Then, by richness of S, there exists Pˆ = [c, b¯] · · · (c, b′] · · · such that b′Pˆ x for all x ∈ A with
the property that c ∈ [x, b¯] ∩ [x, b′]. In view of (7), it follows that ϕd(P
′
2, P−2) > ϕd(Pˆ , P−2).
By the definition of Pˆ , for all y /∈ [c, r1(P
′
2)] with yPˆ d, either y ∈ Y or y ∈ (c, d). If
y ∈ Y , then by Claim 1, ϕy(P
′
2, P−2) = ϕy(Pˆ , P−2). On the other hand, if y ∈ (c, d), then
by single-peakedness, yP ′2d. By our assumption on d, this means ϕy(P
′
2, P−2) = ϕy(Pˆ , P−2).
Combining, we have ϕ(c,d](P
′
2, P−2) > ϕ(c,d](Pˆ
c, P−2), which is a contradiction to Claim 3.
This completes the proof of Claim 4.
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We are now ready to complete the proof of the lemma. Since [t(P1), t(P
′
2)] = [t(P1), c] ∪
(c, t(P ′2)], by (7) and Claim 4 we have ϕd(PN) = ϕd(P
′
2, P−2) for all d /∈ [t(P1), t(P
′
2)]. This
proves condition (i) for the induction step. Condition (ii) for the induction step now follows
by using same arguments as for the proof of (ii) for the base case.
In order to complete the proof of Theorem 3.1, i.e., of the induction step, it is sufficient
to prove the following. Let a, b ∈ A with {a, b} ∈ E, and i ∈ N . Then there exist Pi ∈ S
a
and P ′i ∈ S
b such that for all P−i ∈ S
N\{i} and all d /∈ {a, b} we have
ϕd(Pi, P−i) = ϕd(P
′
i , P−i). (17)
Since ϕ is tops-only by Lemma 3.5, uncompromisingness follows by repeated application of
(17).
We first show (17) if i = 1. Let P−1 ∈ S
N\{1} and t(P2) = c for some c ∈ A. Without
loss of generality assume b ∈ [a, c]. By richness of S, it contains preferences P1 = ab · · · and
P ′1 = ba · · · . By Lemma 3.5, ϕd(P1, P2, P−{1,2}) = ϕd(P2, P2, P−{1,2}) for all d /∈ [a, c] and
ϕd(P
′
1, P2, P−{1,2}) = ϕd(P2, P2, P−{1,2}) for all d /∈ [b, c]. This implies ϕd(P1, P2, P−{1,2}) =
ϕd(P
′
1, P2, P−{1,2}) for all d /∈ [a, c]. By strategy-proofness, ϕ{a,b}(P1, P2, P−{1,2}) = ϕ{a,b}(P
′
1,
P2, P−{1,2}), and hence ϕ[a,c]\{a,b}(P1, P2, P−{1,2}) = ϕ[a,c]\{a,b}(P
′
1, P2, P−{1,2}). Since {a, b} ∈
E, t(P1) = a, and t(P
′
1) = b, by single-peakedness we have P1|[a,c]\{a,b} = P
′
1|[a,c]\{a,b}. By
using Lemma 3.1 with B = {a, b} and C = [a, c] \ {a, b}, we have ϕd(P1, P2, P−{1,2}) =
ϕd(P
′
1, P2, P−{1,2}) for all d 6= a, b. This proves (17) for agent 1. Using a symmetric argument,
(17) can be shown for agent 2.
Finally, we show (17) for agents i ∈ {3, . . . , n}. It is sufficient to show this for i = 3. By
richness of S, it contains preferences P3 = ab · · · and P
′
3 = ba · · · . Let P−3 ∈ S
N\{3}. By
strategy-proofness,
ϕ{a,b}(P1, P2, P3, P−{1,2,3}) = ϕ{a,b}(P1, P2, P
′
3, P−{1,2,3}). (18)
Let t(P1) = c and t(P2) = c
′. We distinguish the following cases.
Case 1. c ∈ [a, c′] or c′ ∈ [a, c].
By Lemma 3.5, ϕd(P1, P1, P3, P−{1,2,3}) = ϕd(P1, P2, P3, P−{1,2,3}) and ϕd(P1, P1, P
′
3, P−{1,2,3})
= ϕd(P1, P2, P
′
3, P−{1,2,3}) for all d /∈ [c, c
′]. Also, by the induction hypothesis, ϕd(P1, P1, P3,
P−{1,2,3}) = ϕd(P1, P1, P
′
3, P−{1,2,3}) for all d /∈ {a, b}. Combining all these, we have for all
d /∈ [c, c′] ∪ {a, b},
ϕd(P1, P2, P3, P−{1,2,3}) = ϕd(P1, P2, P
′
3, P−{1,2,3}). (19)
By (19), (18) implies ϕ[c,c′]\{a,b}(P1, P2, P3, P−{1,2,3}) = ϕ[c,c′]\{a,b}(P1, P2, P
′
3, P−{1,2,3}). Since
{a, b}) ∈ E, by single-peakedness, both c ∈ [a, c′] and c′ ∈ [a, c] imply P3|[c,c′]\{a,b} =
P ′3|[c,c′]\{a,b}. Therefore, by applying Lemma 3.1 with B = {a, b} and C = [c, c
′] \ {a, b},
and by (19), we have ϕd(P1, P2, P3, P−{1,2,3}) = ϕd(P1, P2, P
′
3, P−{1,2,3}) for all d /∈ {a, b}, and
hence (17) for this case.
Case 2. c /∈ [a, c′] and c′ /∈ [a, c].
Let x ∈ (c, c′) such that x ∈ (c, a] ∩ (c′, a]. Let P x ∈ Sx. Then by Case 1, for all
d /∈ {a, b},
ϕd(P
x, P2, P3, P−{1,2,3}) = ϕd(P
x, P2, P
′
3, P−{1,2,3}), and (20)
ϕd(P1, P
x, P3, P−{1,2,3}) = ϕd(P1, P
x, P ′3, P−{1,2,3}). (21)
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By (17) for agents 1 and 2, ϕd(P1, P2, P3, P−{1,2,3}) = ϕd(P
x, P2, P3, P−{1,2,3}) and ϕd(P1, P2, P
′
3,
P−{1,2,3}) = ϕd(P
x, P2, P
′
3, P−{1,2,3}) for all e /∈ [x, c]. By (20), this implies for all d /∈
{a, b} ∪ [x, c],
ϕd(P1, P2, P3, P−{1,2,3}) = ϕd(P1, P2, P
′
3, P−{1,2,3}). (22)
By analogous arguments we obtain for all d /∈ {a, b} ∪ [x, c′],
ϕd(P1, P2, P3, P−{1,2,3}) = ϕd(P1, P2, P
′
3, P−{1,2,3}). (23)
Since [x, c] ∩ [x, c′] = {x}, by (22) and (23), we have for all d /∈ {a, b, x},
ϕd(P1, P2, P3, P−{1,2,3}) = ϕd(P1, P2, P
′
3, P−{1,2,3}). (24)
If x = a, then (24) implies ϕd(P1, P2, P3, P−{1,2,3}) = ϕd(P1, P2, P
′
3, P−{1,2,3}) for all d /∈ {a, b},
establishing (17) for agent 3. If x 6= a, then by (18) and (24), ϕd(P1, P2, P3, P−{1,2,3}) =
ϕd(P1, P2, P
′
3, P−{1,2,3}) for all d /∈ {a, b}, again establishing (17) for agent 3.
Since Cases 1 and 2 are exhaustive, this completes the proof of the theorem.
4 Characterization of all unanimous and strategy-proof
RSCFs
Throughout, S is a rich single-peaked domain.
An allocation function is a function µ : N → AL, and the set of all allocation functions
is denoted by M. In other words, an allocation function assigns each agent to a leaf of the
tree.
Definition 4.1. For a ∈ A, PN ∈ S
N , an allocation function µ is tree-monotonic with respect
to (a, PN) if for all i ∈ N and b ∈ AL, µ(i) = b implies t(Pi) ∈ [a, b].
Thus, an allocation function that is tree-monotonic with respect to an alternative a and
a preference profile assigns each agent to a leaf such that there is a path from a to that leaf
containing the agent’s peak.
The set of allocation functions that are tree-monotonic with respect to (a, PN) is denoted
by M(a, PN). Clearly, if PN , P
′
N ∈ S
N are tops-equivalent, then M(a, PN) = M(a, P
′
N).
The following example illustrates Definition 4.1.
Example 4.1. Consider the tree in Figure 2. Let N = {1, . . . , 6}. For the purpose of
evaluating a tree-monotonic function, by the preceding remark it is sufficient to represent
a profile by its top-alternatives. Consider, then, the profile PN = (a1, a3, a4, a4, a5, a7). In
Table 2, we consider some choices of a, and provide the values of a tree-monotonic allocation
function µ with respect to (a, PN). The values of µ(i) for i = 1, . . . , 6 are shown in the
columns. The rest of the table is self-explanatory.
Definition 4.2. A collection of probability distributions (βµ)µ∈M over A is called tree-
monotonic if it satisfies
(i) for every b ∈ A, βµ(b) = 1 if µ(i) = b for all i ∈ N ,
(ii) for all µ, µˆ ∈M and i ∈ N such that µ(j) = µˆ(j) for all j ∈ N \ {i},
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Figure 2: The tree in Example 4.1
a µ(1) µ(2) µ(3) µ(4) µ(5) µ(6)
a2 a1 a3 a7 a7 a7 a7
a4 a1 a3 a3 a3 a6 a7
a6 a1 a3 a3 a3 a7 a7
Table 2: Illustration of µ
(a) βµˆ([c, µˆ(i)]) ≥ βµ([c, µˆ(i)]) for all c ∈ [µ(i), µˆ(i)],
(b) βµ(c) = βµˆ(c) for all c ∈ A \ [µ(i), µˆ(i)].
Part (i) in this definition says that if all agents are assigned to the same leaf then that
node gets probability one. Part (ii) says that if an agent i moves from one leaf (at µ) to
another (at µˆ), then probability increases along the path from the former to the latter leaf
(part (a)), whereas off this path nothing changes (part (b)). Clearly, the conditions (i),
(ii)(a), and (ii)(b), are the counterparts of the conditions of unanimity, strategy-proofness,
and uncompromisingness of an RSCF.
The following example illustrates the notion of tree-monotonic probability distributions.
Example 4.2. Consider the tree given in Figure 2. Let N = {1, 2, 3}. Consider the proba-
bility distributions (βµ)µ∈M given in Table 3. For simplicity, we assume that the collection
(βµ)µ∈M is ‘anonymous’, which means that the probabilities depend only on the numbers
of agents on the leafs. It is left to the reader to verify that (βµ)µ∈M in this table satisfies
tree-monotonicity.
µ βµ µ βµ
(3, 0, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) (1, 0, 2, 0) (.1, .3, 0, .3, .2, .2, 0)
(0, 3, 0, 0) (0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0) (0, 1, 2, 0) (0, .2, .3, .2, .1, .2, 0)
(0, 0, 3, 0) (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0) (0, 0, 2, 1) (0, 0, 0, 0, .7, .2, .1)
(0, 0, 0, 3) (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1) (1, 0, 0, 2) (.1, .3, 0, .3, .2, 0, .2)
(2, 1, 0, 0) (.4, .3, .3, 0, 0, 0, 0) (0, 1, 0, 2) (0, .2, .3, .2, .1, 0, .2)
(2, 0, 1, 0) (.4, .2, 0, .2, .1, .1, 0) (0, 0, 1, 2) (0, 0, 0, 0, .7, .1, .2)
(2, 0, 0, 1) (.4, .2, 0, .2, .1, 0, .1) (1, 1, 1, 0) (.1, .2, .3, .2, .1, .1, 0)
(1, 2, 0, 0) (.1, .5, .4, 0, 0, 0, 0) (1, 1, 0, 1) (.1, .2, .3, .2, .1, 0, .1)
(0, 2, 1, 0) (0, .2, .4, .2, .1, .1, 0) (1, 0, 1, 1) (.1, .3, 0, .3, .2, .1, .1)
(0, 2, 0, 1) (0, .2, .4, .2, .1, 0, .1) (0, 1, 1, 1) (0, .2, .3, .2, .1, .1, .1)
Table 3: Example 4.2
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Below we will associate an RSCF with each tree-monotonic collection of probability
distributions. As a preparation we need the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1. Let (βµ)µ∈M be a tree-monotonic collection of probability distributions. Let
a ∈ A, b, c ∈ AL, PN ∈ S
N , and µb, µˆb, µc, µˆc ∈ M(a, PN) such that for each x ∈ {b, c} and
all i ∈ N , µx(i) = x if and only if t(Pi) ∈ [a, x] and µˆx(i) = x if and only if t(Pi) ∈ (a, x].
Then
βµb(π[a, b])− βµˆb(π(a, b]) = βµc(π[a, c])− βµˆc(π(a, c]) ≥ 0. (25)
Proof. First, we show that the left-hand side of (25) does not depend on any particular
choice of µˆb. An analogous argument holds for the right-hand side. Take µˆ
′
b ∈ M(a, PN)
such that for all i ∈ N , µˆ′x(i) = x if and only if t(Pi) ∈ (a, x]. Then, by condition (ii)(b) in
Definition 4.2 we have
βµˆx((a, x]) = βµˆ′x((a, x]). (26)
It is sufficient to prove the lemma for the case where a ∈ [b, c]. Otherwise, there is a
d ∈ AL such that both a ∈ [d, b] and a ∈ [d, c]. Then, if we show (25) for the pairs of leafs
b, d and c, d, (25) follows for the pair b, c by combining the two equations. Thus, we assume
a ∈ [b, c]. In view of (26), it is sufficient to show that
βµb([a, b])− βµc((a, b]) = βµc([a, c])− βµb((a, c]).
By condition (ii)(b) in Definition 4.2 we have
βµb [b, c] = βµc [b, c]. (27)
Therefore,
βµb([a, b])− βµc((a, b]) = βµb([b, c])− βµb((a, c])− βµc((a, b])
= βµc([b, c])− βµc((a, b])− βµb((a, c])
= βµc([a, c])− βµb((a, c])
where the second equality follows from (27).
Finally, by condition (ii)(a) in Definition 4.2 we have
βµˆb((a, b]) ≤ βµb((a, b]),
which implies the nonnegativity of the expressions in (25) and completes the proof of the
lemma.
Let B = (βµ)µ∈M be a tree-monotonic collection of probability distributions over A. We
associate a map ϕB : SN →△A by defining, for each a ∈ A and PN ∈ SN ,
ϕBa (PN) = βµb([a, b])− βµˆb((a, b]) (28)
for some b ∈ AL and µb, µˆb ∈ M(a, PN) such that µb(i) = b if and only if t(Pi) ∈ [a, b] and
µˆb(i) = b if and only if t(Pi) ∈ (a, b]. In words, the probability assigned by ϕ
B to alternative
a if the preference profile is PN , is determined as follows. Take an arbitrary leaf b, take
an allocation function where all agents with peaks on the path [a, b] are assigned to b, and
compute the sum of the associated probabilities assigned to alternatives on the path [a, b].
Next, take an allocation function where all agents with peaks on the path (a, b] (but not
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those with peak at a) are assigned to b, and compute the sum of the associated probabilities
assigned to alternatives on the path (a, b]. The difference between these numbers is the
probability assigned to a.
Note that by Lemma 4.1, ϕB is well-defined: it does not depend on the particular choice
of b, µb, or µˆb. We also have:
Lemma 4.2. ϕB defined by (28) is an RSCF.
Proof. By Lemma 4.1, ϕBa (PN) ≥ 0 for every a ∈ A and PN ∈ S
N . We still have to prove
that
∑
a∈A ϕ
B
a (PN) = 1 for every PN ∈ S
N .
Let a ∈ A, b ∈ AL, and let µ ∈ M(a, PN) such that µ(i) = b if and only if t(Pi) ∈ [a, b],
for all i ∈ N . We claim that ϕB[a,b](PN) = βµ([a, b]). To show this, write [a, b] = (a1, . . . , ak),
where a = a1 and b = ak. For every j = 1, . . . , k let µj, µˆj ∈ M(aj, PN) such that for all
i ∈ N we have µ(j) = b⇔ t(Pi) ∈ [aj, b] and µˆ(j) = b⇔ t(Pi) ∈ (aj, b]. Then
ϕB[a,b](PN) = βµ1([a1, b])− βµˆ1((a1, b])
+βµ2([a2, b])− βµˆ2((a2, b])
+βµ3([a3, b])− βµˆ3((a3, b])
...
+βµk({b})− βµˆk(∅)
= βµ1([a1, b])
= βµ([a, b])
where the before last equality follows since βµˆj((aj, b]) = βµˆj([aj+1, b]) = βµj+1([aj+1, b]) for
every j = 1, . . . , k−1 by condition (ii)(b) in Definition 4.2, and also the last equality follows
from this condition.
Now let PN ∈ S
N be arbitrary. We partition A into subsets A1, . . . , Ak, such that each
Aℓ is of the form Aℓ = [aℓ, . . . , bℓ] for some bℓ ∈ AL (possibly a
ℓ = bℓ). We define the
allocation function µ as follows: (i) for each ℓ = 1, . . . , k, µ−1(bℓ) = {i ∈ N | t(Pi) ∈ A
ℓ},
and (ii) for each b ∈ AL \ {b
1, . . . , bk}, µ−1(b) = ∅ (case (ii) occurs if b = aℓ for some ℓ).
Then by condition (ii)(b) in Definition 4.2, for every ℓ = 1, . . . , k there is a µℓ ∈ M(a
ℓ, PN)
such that βµℓ(A
ℓ) = βµ(A
ℓ). Hence, by the previous part of the proof,
∑
a∈A ϕ
B
a (PN) =∑k
ℓ=1 βµℓ(A
ℓ) =
∑k
ℓ=1 βµ(A
ℓ) = βµ(A) = 1.
We call ϕB a tree-monotonic RSCF. An example of a tree-monotonic RSCF is the fol-
lowing.
Example 4.3. Consider the tree given in Figure 2. Let N = {1, 2, 3}. Since a tree-
monotonic RSCF is tops-only, to evaluate the outcome of such an RSCF at some profile
we need to consider only the top alternatives of the agents at that profile. Let ϕ be the
tree-monotonic (anonymous) RSCF with respect to (βµ)µ∈M as given in Table 3. Consider
the profile (a2, a4, a6). The outcome of ϕ at (a2, a4, a6) is shown in Table 4. The table is
self-explanatory.
Our main result will be that these tree-monotonic RSCFs are exactly the unanimous and
strategy-proof RSCFs on our rich single-peaked domain.
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a b βµ(π[a, b])− βµ′(π(a, b]) ϕa(a2, a4, a6)
a1 a1 β(0,3,0,0)(π[a1, a1])− β(0,3,0,0)(π(a1, a1]) 0
a2 a1 β(1,0,2,0)(π[a2, a1])− β(0,1,2,0)(π(a2, a1]) .4
a3 a1 β(1,0,2,0)(π[a3, a1])− β(1,0,2,0)(π(a3, a1]) 0
a4 a1 β(2,0,1,0)(π[a4, a1])− β(1,0,2,0)(π(a4, a1]) .4
a5 a1 β(2,0,1,0)(π[a5, a1])− β(2,0,1,0)(π(a5, a1]) .1
a6 a6 β(2,0,1,0)(π[a6, a6])− β(2,0,0,1)(π(a6, a6]) .1
a7 a6 β(2,0,1,0)(π[a7, a6])− β(2,0,1,0)(π(a7, a6]) 0
Table 4: An example showing the values of ϕa(PN)
Lemma 4.3. Let B = (βµ)µ∈M be a tree-monotonic collection of probability distributions
over A. Then ϕB is unanimous and strategy-proof.
Proof. Unanimity follows directly from the definition of ϕ. In this proof we write ϕ instead
of ϕB and first show that ϕ is uncompromising. Let PN ∈ S
N , i ∈ N , P ′i ∈ S, and
d ∈ A \ [t(Pi), t(P
′
i )]. Take b ∈ AL such that [d, b] ∩ [t(Pi), t(P
′
i )] = ∅. Then, by definition of
ϕ, in particular (28), we obtain ϕd(PN) = ϕd(P−i, P
′
i ). This shows that ϕ is uncompromising.
In order to prove strategy-proofness, assume for contradiction that there exists i ∈ N ,
PN ∈ S
N , and P ′i ∈ S such that ϕU(c,Pi)(PN) < ϕU(c,Pi)(P
′
i , P−i) for some c ∈ A. Since ϕ is
uncompromising, we have ϕz(PN) = ϕz(P
′
i , P−i) for all z /∈ [t(Pi), t(P
′
i )]. Therefore, we may
assume without loss of generality that c ∈ [t(Pi), t(P
′
i )) and
ϕπ[r1(Pi),c](PN) < ϕπ[r1(Pi),c](P
′
i , P−i). (29)
Let d appear just after c along the path [t(Pi), t(P
′
i )]. Let P
c ∈ Sc and P d ∈ Sd. By un-
compromisingness, ϕ[t(Pi),c](PN) = ϕ[t(Pi),c](P
c, P−i) and ϕ[t(Pi),c](P
d, P−i) = ϕ[t(Pi),c](P
′
i , P−i).
By (29), this yields ϕ[t(Pi),c](P
c, P−i) < ϕ[t(Pi),c](P
d, P−i). Since by uncompromisingness
ϕz(P
c, P−i) = ϕz(P
d, P−i) for all z /∈ {c, d}, this implies
ϕc(P
c, P−i) < ϕc(P
d, P−i). (30)
Now take b, b′ ∈ AL such that {c, d} ⊆ [b, b
′] and d /∈ [b, c]. By (28),
ϕc(P
c, P−i) = βµb([c, b])− βµˆb((c, b]) (31)
where µb, µˆb ∈ M(c, (P
c, P−i)) are such that µb(j) = b if and only if t(Pj) ∈ [c, b] and
µˆb(j) = b if and only if t(Pj) ∈ (c, b] for all j ∈ N . Let µ
′
b be such that µ
′
b(j) = µ(j) for
all j ∈ N \ {i} and µ′b(i) = b
′; and let µˆ′b = µˆb. Note that µ
′
b, µˆ
′
b ∈ M(c, (P
d, P−i)). Also,
writing PˆN = (P
d, P−i), we have µ
′
b(j) = b if and only if t(Pˆj) ∈ [c, b] and µˆ
′
b(j) = b if and
only if t(Pˆj) ∈ (c, b] for all j ∈ N . Therefore, by (28),
ϕc(P
d, P−i) = βµ′
b
([c, b])− βµˆ′
b
((c, b]). (32)
By (30), (31), (32), and the fact that µˆ′b = µˆb, we get
βµb(π[c, b]) < βµ′b(π[c, b]). (33)
However, as (i) µ−1b (bˆ) = µ
′−1
b (bˆ) for all bˆ ∈ AL \ {b, b
′} and (ii) µ′−1b (b) ⊆ µ
−1
b (b), this
contradicts condition (ii)(a) in Definition 4.2.
15
Next we show the converse of Lemma 4.3.
Lemma 4.4. Let ϕ be a unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF. Then there is a tree-monotonic
collection of probability distributions B = (βµ)µ∈M such that ϕ = ϕ
B.
Proof. First note that ϕ is uncompromising by Theorem 3.1. For every µ ∈ M define
βµ = ϕ(PN), where PN ∈ S
N satisfies t(Pi) = µ(i) for all i ∈ N .
We first show that B = (βµ)µ∈M thus defined, is a tree-monotonic collection. Clearly,
since ϕ is unanimous, condition (i) in Definition 4.2 is satisfied. For condition (ii), let
µ, µˆ ∈ M and i ∈ N such that µ(j) = µˆ(j) for all j ∈ N \ {i} and let PN , PˆN such that
t(Pk) = µ(k) and t(Pˆk) = µˆ(k) for all k ∈ N . Since ϕ is uncompromising, ϕc(PN) = ϕc(PˆN)
for all c /∈ [t(Pi), t(Pˆi)], hence βµ(c) = βµˆ(c) for all c /∈ [µ(i), µˆ(i)], i.e., condition (ii)(b)
is satisfied. Moreover, by strategy-proofness of ϕ we have for all c ∈ [t(Pi), t(Pˆi)] that
ϕU(c,Pˆi)(PˆN) ≥ ϕU(c,Pˆi)(PN). Since ϕz(PN) = ϕz(PˆN) for all z /∈ [t(Pi), t(Pˆi)], this implies
ϕ[c,Pˆi](PˆN) ≥ ϕ[c,Pˆi](PN), and therefore βµˆ([c, µˆ(i)]) ≥ βµ([c, µˆ(i)]) for all c ∈ [µ(i), µˆ(i)]. This
proves condition (ii)(a).
Finally, we show that ϕ = ϕB. Let PN ∈ S
N and a ∈ A. Let µ′, µ′′ ∈ M(a, PN) and
b ∈ AL such that, for all i ∈ N , µ
′(i) = b if and only if t(Pi) ∈ [a, b] and µ
′′(i) = b if and
only if t(Pi) ∈ (a, b]. also, let P
′
N ∈ S
N such that P ′i = µ
′(i) for all i ∈ N and P ′′N ∈ S
N such
that P ′′i = µ
′′(i) for all i ∈ N . Then
ϕBa (P
N) = βµ′([a, b])− βµ′′((a, b])
= ϕ[a,b](P
′
N)− ϕ(a,b](P
′′
N)
= ϕa(PN)
where the last equality follows by uncompromisingness of ϕ. We conclude that ϕ = ϕB.
Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4 now imply the following result, which is the main result of the paper.
Theorem 4.1. Let S be a rich single-peaked domain. Then an RSCF ϕ on SN is unanimous
and strategy-proof if and only if it is tree-monotonic.
5 Final remarks
The collection of tree-monotonic RSCFs contains deterministic functions, i.e., social choice
functions that assign probability one to some alternative. It is not difficult to verify that these
deterministic functions correspond to tree monotonic collections B = (βµ)µ∈M satisfying the
following conditions: (1) for every µ ∈ M, βµ(x) = 1 for some x ∈ A; (2) for every µ ∈ M,
βµ(b) = 1 if µ(i) = b for some b ∈ AL and all i ∈ N ; and (3) for all µ, µˆ ∈ M and i ∈ N
such that µ(j) = µˆ(j) for all j ∈ N \ {i}, we have: if βµ(a) = 1 for some a ∈ [µ(i), µˆ(i)] then
βµˆ(b) = 1 for some b ∈ [a, µˆ(i)], and βµ = βµˆ otherwise.
We conclude with an example which shows that under the current domain assumptions
not every tree-monotonic RSCF can be written as a convex combination of deterministic tree-
monotonic social choice functions. As mentioned earlier, on line-graphs these conditions are
weaker than those in Peters et al. (2014). The question how these conditions should be
strengthened to obtain all tree-monotonic RSCFs as convex combinations of deterministic
tree-monotonic social choice functions is still open.
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Figure 3: The tree in Example 5.1
Example 5.1. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and A = {a, b, c, d}, with tree E as in Figure 3. We
consider the (anonymous) tree-monotonic rule with tree-monotonic allocation functions as
in the following table, in which β(j,k,l) denotes the probabilities assigned by the (anonymous)
allocation function where j agents are allocated to a, k agents to b, and l agents to c.
a b c d
β(1,1,1) .5 .3 .2 0
β(2,1,0) .7 .3 0 0
β(1,2,0) .5 .4 0 .1
β(2,0,1) .7 0 .2 .1
β(1,0,2) .5 0 .3 .2
β(0,2,1) 0 .4 .2 .4
β(0,1,2) 0 .3 .3 .4
Additionally, β(3,0,0), β(0,3,0), and β(0,0,3) assign probability 1 to a, b, and c, respectively. The
associated RSCF is denoted by ψ, and we will show that ψ cannot be written as a convex
combination of unanimous and strategy-proof deterministic rules.
Let F be the set of all unanimous and strategy-proof deterministic rules on the single-
peaked domain on the tree given in Figure 3. Further, for an alternative x and a profile PN ,
let F (x, PN) be the set of all deterministic rules f such that f(PN) = x. By (S1, S2, S3), where
S1, S2, S3 are disjoint with union N , we mean a boundary profile where the top-alternatives
of the agents in S1, S2, and S3 are a, b, and c, respectively. Let F1 = F (a, ({1, 2}, {3}, ∅)),
F2 = F (b, ({1, 3}, {2}, ∅)), F3 = F (c, ({1}, {2}, {3})), F4 = F (b, ({1, 2}, {3}, ∅)), and F5 =
F (b, ({1}, {2, 3}, ∅)). Then, by Theorem 4.1, or more directly by uncompromisingness (The-
orem 3.1), it follows that F1 ∩ F3 = ∅ and F2 ∩ F3 = ∅. Combining, we have
(F1 ∪ F2) ∩ F3 = ∅. (34)
Assume for contradiction that ψ can be written as
∑
f∈F αff . For G ⊆ F , let αG =
∑
f∈G αf .
Then αF1∪F2 = αF1 + αF2 − αF1∩F2 together with (34), yields αF1 + αF2 − αF1∩F2 + αF3 ≤ 1.
Since ϕ =
∑
f∈F αff , it must be that αF1 = ψa({1, 2}, {3}, ∅), αF2 = ψb({1, 3}, {2}, ∅),
αF3 = ψc({1}, {2}, {3}). Using the values given in the table we obtain
αF1∩F2 ≥ 0.2. (35)
Since the rules in F1 and F4 give different outcomes (a and b, respectively) at the same
profile ({1, 2}, {3}, ∅), we have F1∩F4 = ∅. Moreover, by uncompromisingness, F2 ⊆ F5 and
F4 ⊆ F5, and hence F2 ∪ F4 ⊆ F5. Because F1 ∩ F4 = ∅, we have
(F1 ∩ F2) ∩ F4 = ∅. (36)
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Also, because F2 ∪ F4 ⊆ F5,
(F1 ∩ F2) ∪ F4 ⊆ F5. (37)
Combining (36) and (37), we have αF1∩F2 +αF4 ≤ αF5 . By (35) and the table, αF1∩F2 +αF4 ≥
0.5, and hence αF5 ≥ 0.5. However, this contradicts the fact that αF5 = 0.4. This proves
that ψ cannot be written as a convex combination of deterministic rules.
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